Ακαδημαϊκά Ερευνητικά Σεμινάρια στις Οικονομικές Επιστήμες: Strategic Delegation to Organizations
Ακαδημαϊκά Ερευνητικά Σεμινάρια στις Οικονομικές Επιστήμες, 2020-2021
Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών
Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Dear All,
We would like to inform you for the following research seminar:
Wednesday, June 2, 2021, 19:00-20:30
Petros Sekeris, Associate professor in Economics, Montpellier Business School.
URL: https://sites.google.com/view/petros-sekeris/home
Title: Strategic Delegation to Organizations (with D. Xefteris)Password (in case needed):i9vQMPUsb33
Abstract
In this paper we show that a principal can increase her payoffs by delegating decisions to an organization of agents {i.e. to a group of rational individuals who interact according to specified rules{ even when the agents' preferences are identical to those of the principal. The mechanism driving this result rests on the limited impact of individual choices on the _rm's policy, when more than one agents interact in shaping it. In strategic setups, delegating decisions to organizations of agents augments the set of equilibrium outcomes, allowing for Pareto improvements. Hence, our results provide a novel rationale for decentralized decision-making in _rms evolving in competitive environments. JEL: D71, D72. Keywords: delegation; organizations; decentralization; efficiency.
Organizers:
Assoc. Professor Dimitris Kenourgios
Assist. Professor George Dotsis
Assist. Professor Frago Kourandi
Department of Economics, NKUA.
http://www.econ.uoa.gr/ereynhtika-seminaria-research-seminars.html
Thank you